

Egg: An Extensible and Economics-Inspired Open Grid Computing Platform



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GECON 2006

Grids

- internal realm:
 - Java, python, C++, applications
 - Science, engineering, art
 - Happy
- external realm:
 - OS. Disk. WAN. Firewall. HTTP. Installation.
 - People, organizations
 - Labor intensive. (54 sites for OSG)
 - Sad

Current (Science) Grids

- No global resource allocation mechanism
- Installing and maintaining grid infrastructure software is time-intensive and difficult
- Converting applications to be grid-enabled is time-intensive and difficult
- Complex to express user and organizational policies, user needs

What is Egg?

- Egg == Extensible and Economics-Inspired Open Grid Computing Platform
- Goals: open, efficient, simple grid computing, respect organization boundaries
- "Programming the external world"
- Collaboration: **CS** + **Physics** + **Economics**
 - Boston University, Harvard University
 - L.Kang, C.Ng, M.Seltzer, D.Parkes
 - J.Brunelle, P.Hurst, J.Huth, J.Shank, S.Youssef
 - A.Sunderam

In the beginning...

Boston University

Software environment
computing, i.e. creating
and manipulating
software environments

Harvard

Economic mechanism
design; bidding systems,
provenance & file
systems, resource
prediction

+ Collaboration on ATLAS, several years of
experience with Globus-based Grids and BU's
new ATLAS "Tier 2" center.

In the beginning...

Boston University

Harvard


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Economic mechanism design;
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But what do these have to do with each other? ...And how do they fit into the (over-)complicated world of grid computing?

dCache Netlogger Alien Ganglia Panda VDT
 Condor
GLOBUS Pacman Resource PBS Chimera
 SRM Brokers Gums Web services
iVDGL VDS LSF EGEE
RLS OSG VOMS Dirac Capone
PPDG Eowyn Dial Glue gLite Clarens
 MonaLisa Virtual EDG LCG GridCat
DISUN DRM ACDC Machines Classads


To begin, let's think about "Pacman" (S.Youssef, BU)



[Pacman is used by ATLAS (>1800 physicists, >150 labs, 34 countries), OSG, Virtual Data Kit (incl. Condor and Globus), TeraGrid,... >800,000 Pacman downloads (3/12/06), ~1000 new installations per day in 50+ countries, supported on 14 OS.]




We can let all computations be "installations."



But which path should E follow?




Resolving the put ambiguity == Resource allocation



$F(\text{Job description}, \text{Cache history}, \text{Cache contents})$
 $\Rightarrow \sim \text{Opportunity cost}$



User level concepts can be simple and can be put in a familiar, easy to learn context.



```
% egg
```

```
egg> cd ~David
```

```
egg> lc
```

```
myEgg.caches hu.playCluster david.grid david.playStation  
results/ papers/ jobs/ Tier2/ identities/
```

```
egg> cd jobs
```

```
egg> lc
```

```
job1.eggshell job2.eggshell job3.eggshell
```

```
egg> put job2.eggshell ../david.playStation
```

```
egg> cd ../david.playStation
```

```
egg> lc
```

```
queue/ running/ history/ earnings/ access/
```

```
egg> lc
queue/ running/ history/ earnings/ access/
egg> lc -r
queue/
    job2.eggshell
        ATLAS.Higgs.HU.David:10@
running/
    job1.eggshell
        ATLAS.Higgs.HU.David:10@
        results/
            seeds higgs.aod athena.log error.log
earnings/
    ATLAS.Higgs.BU.Saul.CANCELLED:10@
    Harvard.EECS.Margo.Laura.CANCELLED:1@
access/
    *.Saul
    *.Margo.?
```




How do I run my ATLAS job?

job1.eggshell

```
put ~ATLAS/10.5.0 .  
put ~David/jobs/binary1 .  
put ~David/jobs/job1.in .  
put ./results/job1.out ~David/results  
pay ATLAS.Higgs.HU.David:10@  
    when gmTime < 1-Apr-2006  
shell echo "done"
```

```
egg> put job1.eggshell ~David/mygrid
```


```
egg>
```



You mean I can find out
how long my jobs will take?

job1.eggshell

```
put ~ATLAS/10.5.0 .  
put ~David/jobs/binary1 .  
put ~David/jobs/job1.in .  
put ./results/job1.out ~David/results  
pay ATLAS.Higgs.HU.David:10@  
    when gmTime < 1-Apr-2006  
shell echo "done"
```



```
egg> put job1.eggshell ~David/mygrid
```

```
egg> lc ~David/mygrid/job1*
```


```
job1.eggshell
```

```
e.t.a. 25-Mar-2006 +- 2 days
```


```
estimated cost ATLAS:Higgs.HU.David:8.3@
```



Main Innovations



Microeconomics. All actions (installations, downloads, uploads, etc.) are put and gets. Made efficient by bidding mechanism. Simple + transparent to users.




Macroeconomics. Multiple currencies. Policy autonomy. Support for interoperation between grids. Simple + transparent to users.



Open + Extensible. E.g., IBM can develop own bidding agent for its compute servers.




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reverse auctions, role of Egg platform



Macroeconomics. Multiple currencies. Policy autonomy. Support for interoperation between grids. Simple + transparent to users.

currency, exchange rate, role of banks




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Novelty: Open mechanism design

- Open: unrealistic to propose a particular selling mechanism that all resource owners should use
- Dynamic, distributed, asynchronous
 - e.g., a single, centralized, forward combinatorial auction would not work
- **Our solution: Egg platform places constraints on mechanisms (price tables, admissibility)**

First: User Expressiveness

- Describe Job in Eggshell
 - executable files, input files, loops, etc.
 - maps to bundle S of resources
- Describe a "value schedule" $v_i(S, t_f)$.




- Simplify for users via default schedules

Now to Open MD: Price Admissibility


admissible prices == user i faces a price, $p_i^t(S, t_f)$, in period t , for bundle S and completion by t_f that is:

- (a) independent of agent i
- (b) increases monotonically with $S' \supset S$
- (c) increases monotonically with current time, t

 A reverse auction with admissible prices, and in which agent i receives completion time t_f that maximizes $v_i(S, t_f) - p_i^t(S, t_f)$, is strategyproof.

⇒ Egg enforces monotonicity of prices wrt S and t through price tables; enforces maximal decision.

Price Tables




$$p_i^t(S, t_f) = p_i^{\text{NET}}(S_{\text{net}}, t_f) + p_i^{\text{CPU}}(S_{\text{cpu}}, t_f) + p_i^{\text{DISK}}(S_{\text{disk}}, t_f)$$

Caches maintain entries in price tables (but, cannot reduce prices, & must retain monotonicity w/ size.)


➔ egg platform enforces this

egg platform conducts a reverse auction



Example: Buying Storage

- "Deadline 5hrs", estimated space is 2GB for 2 hrs.



Cache's price table


	$t_0 + 1$	+2	+3	+4	+5			
Disk space	1G	4	3	5	8	6		
2G	5	8	6	9	7			
3G	6	9	8	12	9			

The table is titled "Cache's price table". The horizontal axis is labeled "time (hrs)" with an arrow pointing right. The vertical axis is labeled "Disk space" with a downward-pointing arrow. The table has 4 rows and 8 columns. The first row is the header with time intervals $t_0 + 1$, +2, +3, +4, +5. The first column is the header with disk space values 1G, 2G, 3G. The cell containing the value 8 in the row for 2G and the column for +2 is highlighted with a red border.

Collate responses. Choose to allocate to best cache.
Only pay if completed by estimated time.

Example: Buying Storage

- "Deadline 5hrs", estimated space is 2GB for 2 hrs.




Cache's price table

	$t_0 + 1$	+2	+3	+4	+5			
Disk space	1G	4	3	5	8	6		
2G	5	8	6	9	7			
3G	6	9	8	12	9			

Should not be \$3
(monotonicity)

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
Cache's price table

		t_0+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6	time (hrs)
Disk space	1G	4	3	5	8	6		
	2G	5	8	6	9	7	2	
	3G	6	9	8	12	9		

Suppose (2G,6) is \$2. Better to over-report deadline?

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Cache's price table

time (hrs)


	$t_0 + 1$	+2	+3	+4		
Disk space						
1G	4	3	5	8	6	
2G	5	8	6	8	7	
3G	6	9	8	12	9	

A blue arrow points from the value 12 in the (3G, +3) cell to the value 4 on the right side of the table.

Suppose time ticks forward, and price in (2G, +3) falls.

Example: Buying Storage

- "Deadline 5hrs", estimated space is 2GB for 2 hrs.



Cache's price table

time (hrs) →

		t_0+1	+2	+3	+4		
Disk space ↓	1G	4	3	5	8	6	
	2G	5	8	6	10	7	
	3G	6	9	8	12	9	

4


Delay "arrival." Payment \$10, not \$13.

Next steps: Micro

- **Resource estimation via machine learning**
 - Statistical learning problem
 - Learn $g : \text{job} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^k$
 - for k dimensions of local resources
 - Each cache keeps local history
 - Updates model (g)
 - Consider linear-regression trees, SVMs, k-nearest neighbor...
- **Bidding strategy by caches**
 - Decision theoretic problem
 - Maximize expected revenue subject to capacity constraints, price-table monotonicity constraints
 - Consider model-based approach, w/ estimate of success for different prices




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

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Need for Policy Tools

- Large-scale collaborative science is often driven by organizations.
- Organizations want high-level control over resource access, priorities, etc.
- Policy requires control of currency [to print, allocate, tax, etc.]
 - ⇒ need multiple currencies
 - (or tight integration, c.f. EU)

Motivating Scenario I: ATLAS project

- Create ATLAS bank and ATLAS eggs. Create accounts for research scientists. (Tier 2 at BU. Jim Shank comput. manager for ATLAS)
- Meeting of stakeholders: searching for Higgs boson over next month requires 70% global resources
- Print and allocate ATLAS currency to Higgs manager, who further delegates. Users retain control about which analysis jobs to run.





Motivating Scenario II: BU & Harvard

- Harvard and BU decide to share grid resources.
- Banks retain local currency. **Exchange rate.**
- HU caches annotated:
 - accept **BU.*** and **HU.*** currency
 - hard constraints on **x%** of BU jobs that can run
- BU caches similarly.
- Users at HU can use BU caches **transparently**.
Maintain HU eggs. Exchange via BU bank.
- BU **protected** if HU decides to print a million HU eggs.



Our currency serves many purposes.



- *.Laura
- Harvard.EECS.Margo.?
- Harvard.EECS.Margo.*
- *.Margo.?
- *.EECS.*

Accounting,
check for
duplicates,
currency
exchange, etc.

Anatomy of a piece of an Egg

Harvard.CS.Alice[Apr-02-06]:10.0@



Generating by
the Harvard
identity



Tranferred
from
Harvard to
CS and
signed by
CS



Transferred
from CS to
Alice and
signed by
Alice



Expiration date



Denomination

An Example of a Transaction


Harvard

(1) Rate established
at 2 HU: 1 BU

BU




(4) Bank sends
200 HU Eggs




(5) BU bank holds
200 HU eggs (can
verify), *on completion*
transfers 100 BU
Eggs to cache's
account, returns
cancelled check.

(3) User pays
via local bank
**(transparent
to user)**



user



(2) Cache wants 100 BU eggs for user's job



cache

Exchange rates: Desirable Properties

- Facilitate cross-grid exchange
 - Prevent abuse by autonomous economies
 - Preserve value of currency used to pay for services
-
- Extensible: we provide first versions

Idea One: Based on 'Spending Power'

$$r_{bh} = \frac{c_h / q_h}{c_b / q_b}$$

c_i : # currency

q_i : # resources

$$x_b \cdot r_{bh} = x_h$$



HU economy



BU economy

- need to instrument economies
- need to measure q_i across different resources [use relative prices w/in an economy, combined with some numeraire good. (or gold standard economy). real world GDP doesn't help.]

Idea Two: Trading Agents

Simple trading agents

Take positions in currency

Set prices to equilibrate supply and demand

Monitor positions. Swap out.

Willingness to take a position should depend on stability of economy

Lots of ideas hear from finance!



HU economy



BU economy



PPP: Test of Well-functioning system

Purchasing Power Parity

- In the long run, prices should move toward rates that equalize the prices of an identical basket of goods across countries
- **Requires:** basket is traded across borders, no tariffs, constant profit margins, same productivity, ...
?? ok for grids

	Big Mac prices		Implied PPP* of the dollar	Actual dollar exchange rate April 22nd	Under (-)/over (+) valuation against the dollar, %
	in local currency	in dollars			
United States†	\$2.71	2.71			
Argentina	Peso 4.10	1.43	1.51	2.88	-47
Australia	A\$3.00	1.86	1.11	1.61	-31
Brazil	Real 4.55	1.48	1.68	3.07	-45
Britain	£1.99	3.14	1.36‡	1.58‡	+16
Canada	C\$3.20	2.21	1.18	1.45	-18
Chile	Peso 1,400	1.95	517	716	-28
China	Yuan 9.90	1.20	3.65	8.28	-56
Czech Rep	Koruna 56.57	1.96	20.9	28.9	-28
Denmark	DKr27.75	4.10	10.2	6.78	+51
Egypt	Pound 8.00	1.35	2.95	5.92	-50
Euro area	€2.71	2.97	1.00§	1.10§	+10
Hong Kong	HK\$11.50	1.47	4.24	7.80	-46
Hungary	Forint 490	2.18	181	224	-19
Indonesia	Rupiah 16,100	1.84	5,941	8,740	-32
Japan	¥262	2.19	96.7	120	-19
Malaysia	M\$5.04	1.33	1.86	3.80	-51

The Economist, April 2003

Conclusions

- Egg provides an extensible and economics-inspired grid computing platform
- Close-collaboration between CS, physics, economics
- Spawning many subprojects
 - statistical machine learning for resource prediction
 - open MD for sequential environments
 - opportunity-cost based schedulers
 - algorithms to compute exchange rates
 - languages for environment computing
- Extensible + Open:: Define and implement platform, first versions of various caches. Continual innovation (by anyone) will be supported and encouraged.

www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs